Objectivism, Ethics & Reason

This post is in reply to Andrea’s post on Objectivist Morality.

As I start this post, I realize that if I am going to attempt to show why I disagree with the code that is Objectivist ethics, I probably owe an explanation of my own moral philosophy. I will try and get to that sometime this weekend or early next week. I promise.

After I read Andrea’s post, I went back and re-read “The Objectivist Ethics,” and my problem is not so much with the code of Objectivisim in and of itself, I can see how that would be the logical outcome given it’s premises, my problem is with its premises. Don’t get me wrong, I still think that the code itself is rather peculiar, (e.g. “Since everything man needs has to be discovered by his own mind and produced by his own effort…” An odd claim for a proponent of capitalism & I assume comparative advantage, no? There are other examples of this cognitive dissonance scattered throughout the article, if you don’t believe me go read it, I gave you the link.) but that’s not the point of this post. This post will be about the engine of Objectivism, reason, as well as the importance of convention.

The Foundations of Reason

What is reason? Ms. Rand appears to think that it is a single cognitive tool that serves a specific purpose, “Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses.” Now that’s a fine position to have, except as best as I can tell, there is no reason to think that either of those things are true. Given what I know of science and neurology, the mind is segmented with different parts playing different roles, processing the information that we gather through our senses and lives. Reason then, the process of formal logic, can only be understood as the coordination of these various mental faculties. Reason, whatever it actually is, has to be understood through the lens of convention, and is a cultural phenomenon, something Ms. Rand and objectivists completely disregard, much to my chagrin I must add.

In simpler terms, reason as we understand it is a construct based on the culture that we live in. This established, is there any reason to believe that reason is capable of helping us reach one true moral code?  I contend that there is not. I could go into what would inevitably turn into a rather complex argument, but I honestly feel like I can better prove my point with some real life examples. Take a member of the Taliban from Afghanistan and your average american (White, Christian, median income, just you know, average) citizen. If you asked either of them if they believed the other person was moral, they would almost assuredly reply “Absolutely not!” I imagine they would be rather indignant too. Now the Objectivist would probably object on the grounds that because they believe in religion, neither of these individuals are rational beings at all. They are wrong. This is a point that I owe entirely to my friend Gerry, although I did at first resist. Belief can be rationally justified. This is a subject that probably needs more elaboration, and at some point I’m sure I’ll get there, actually if Gerry is willing I’d love to have him write that post (What do you think Gerry?), but I’m digressing.

Each of the two members of the above example have a moral code which was shaped by their cultural and societal norms, the same things reason is a slave to, so how could they possibly reach the one true moral code? They couldn’t even if one existed, reason doesn’t function the way that objectivists need it to in order for their theory of morality to hold true.  To reiterate the point one more time, reason is the process of logical reason, but as Hume wrote, “Reason is a slave to the passions,” it can only be used in the context of culture and societal conventions.

This post is already longer than I wanted it to be, but I’d like to leave you with a couple other questions to think about:

• Assume that reason is a natural ability not dependent on context, why is survival it’s function? As the great Harvard Philosopher Robert Nozick asked, Why couldn’t someone rationally choose not to care about their life and kill themselves?
• If life is the basis of values, why don’t objectivists spend all of their time trying to maximize that? Why don’t objectivists spend all of their time eating tofu and sipping weak tea while locked inside of a sterile room?

Mid-Week Mental Health Break: Thanksgiving edition

I’m planning on replying to Andrea’s post on objectivism over the course of the next couple of days, for now though, here’s Adam Sandler’s ‘Thanksgiving Song.’

Objectivist Morality

Many people disagree with Ayn Rand’s objectivist philosophy, especially when it comes to the issue of morality. How can there be only one true moral code, when people have such different values? The answer is through reason.

As rational human beings, we can all agree that it is immoral to kill and to steal. Why? Not because our parents told us it was wrong, or because religion threatens us with punishment for these acts. It is immoral because we are depriving someone else of their natural right to “life, liberty, and property.” Through reason, we strive to achieve our own happiness (a selfish act which Ayn Rand labeled as a virtue) without hindering that of others. Killing and stealing clearly violate this principle, and can therefore be regarded as immoral.

It may not be so black and white when it comes to other situations: making the right moral choice falls between a few shades of gray, and the decision becomes harder. Ayn Rand argued that through reason, and by staying true to reality, we can follow the universal moral code and clearly distinguish between right and wrong (or black and white). Happiness is attainable through honesty and truth.

Let’s take the example of drinking excessively and/or using drugs. According to objectivists, drug abuse is immoral because: 1) it is an artificial “happiness” 2) it hinders one’s sense of reason. Some people don’t think twice about it and just go along with the crowd. These “irrationals” have not given any thought as to whether or not using drugs is moral. The rest of those who consciously choose to abuse drugs are looking for a quick fix for their happiness. They are aware of the long-term consequences and deliberately ignore them. They have made a rational decision to act “immorally.”

The moral code is supposed to be a path to true inner happiness. Sacrifices are essential in the short term (studying, working, etc.), but the path is a successful one. Although drugs merely offer an “escape” from reality, the reality continues. The escape is only temporary, and the instant gratification from these external substances elicits diminishing marginal returns. As time goes on, one must increase the doses to get less and less of the original effect, making it harder to embrace reality and become truly happy.  Integrity has been compromised for a few instances of artificial happiness.

Now that we have established the immorality of substance abuse through reason, it is important to note that Ayn Rand was a fervent individualist. It is not anyone’s duty to monitor adherence of the universal code. This is up to the individual, as it should only be followed willingly. Unless it is endangering the lives of others (i.e. while driving), it is no one’s job but your own to decide whether or not you live a moral life.

Ayn Rand, contrary to popular belief, was not telling the world to live a certain way of life. She merely stated that there is right and wrong, which can be explained through reason. Sometimes when faced with making a decision, we fail to see all that is around us, making us “irrational.” In order to achieve happiness, the objectivist principle advocates staying true to ourselves and aware of the reality around us. Happiness is the ultimate goal of humankind which can be attained by following moral values. We are only human, but we can strive to become, what Ayn Rand calls, the “ideal” person.

The Real Lesson of Thanksgiving

I first heard this story about Thanksgiving two years ago from my International Economic Policy Professor Peter Leeson (He shares credit with the Profs. Boudreaux as I occasionally collectively Don & Karol Boudreaux in my head for me adding my economics major.) and with it just a few days a way, I thought I’d share it with all of you. This article is by Ben Powell (A former GMU PhD, so’s Dr. Leeson btw.):

The Pilgrims’ Real Thanksgiving Lesson

November 25, 2008

Benjamin Powell

Alexandria Daily Town Talk, Advocate-Messenger, Hillsdale Daily News, Current-Argus

Feast and football. That’s what many of us think about at Thanksgiving. Most people identify the origin of the holiday with the Pilgrims’ first bountiful harvest. But few understand how the Pilgrims actually solved their chronic food shortages.

Many people believe that after suffering through a severe winter, the Pilgrims’ food shortages were resolved the following spring when the Native Americans taught them to plant corn and a Thanksgiving celebration resulted. In fact, the pilgrims continued to face chronic food shortages for three years until the harvest of 1623. Bad weather or lack of farming knowledge did not cause the pilgrims’ shortages. Bad economic incentives did.

In 1620 Plymouth Plantation was founded with a system of communal property rights. Food and supplies were held in common and then distributed based on equality and need as determined by Plantation officials. People received the same rations whether or not they contributed to producing the food, and residents were forbidden from producing their own food. Governor William Bradford, in his 1647 history, Of Plymouth Plantation, wrote that this system was found to breed much confusion and discontent and retard much employment that would have been to their benefit and comfort. The problem was that young men, that were most able and fit for labour, did repine that they should spend their time and strength to work for other men’s wives and children without any recompense. Because of the poor incentives, little food was produced.

Faced with potential starvation in the spring of 1623, the colony decided to implement a new economic system. Every family was assigned a private parcel of land. They could then keep all they grew for themselves, but now they alone were responsible for feeding themselves. While not a complete private property system, the move away from communal ownership had dramatic results.

This change, Bradford wrote, had very good success, for it made all hands very industrious, so as much more corn was planted than otherwise would have been. Giving people economic incentives changed their behavior. Once the new system of property rights was in place, the women now went willingly into the field, and took their little ones with them to set corn; which before would allege weakness and inability.

Once the Pilgrims in the Plymouth Plantation abandoned their communal economic system and adopted one with greater individual property rights, they never again faced the starvation and food shortages of the first three years. It was only after allowing greater property rights that they could feast without worrying that famine was just around the corner.

We are direct beneficiaries of the economics lesson the pilgrims learned in 1623. Today we have a much better developed and well-defined set of property rights. Our economic system offers incentives for us—in the form of prices and profits—to coordinate our individual behavior for the mutual benefit of all; even those we may not personally know.

It is customary in many families to give thanks to the hands that prepared this feast during the Thanksgiving dinner blessing. Perhaps we should also be thankful for the millions of other hands that helped get the dinner to the table: the grocer who sold us the turkey, the truck driver who delivered it to the store, and the farmer who raised it all contributed to our Thanksgiving dinner because our economic system rewards them. That’s the real lesson of Thanksgiving. The economic incentives provided by private competitive markets where people are left free to make their own choices make bountiful feasts possible.

The Disappearing Kaffir Culture

more about “The Disappearing Kaffir Culture“, posted with vodpod

Historians say that the Kaffirs of Sri Lanka started arriving from the eastern shores of Africa in the 1500s with the Portuguese, and later in more waves with the different colonizers of Sri Lanka.

‘Kaffir culture’ is a video portrait of one such community of Kaffirs and the struggle to keep their culture alive in the face of falling numbers.

Written and produced by Kannan Arunasalam.

CATO’s Dan Mitchell on Healthcare

The most annoying thing about the HC bill is the projected fines the government expects to collect.

 

(HT: Cafe Hayek)

Real- World Morality

Over at Secular Right Heather MacDonald addresses the accusation that atheists are commonly faced with- “No God, No Morality.”

The problem with creating a notion of “secular authority” is that you run into . . .  the “great sez who?” Eventually, without a belief in a transcendent moral order . . .  appeals to authority eventually are futile. . . .  Maybe two or three generations can feed off of the inherited patrimony of the civilization without embracing its underlying ethos, but eventually that patrimony gets exhausted and the “grand sez who?” phenomenon sets in.

Her post is excellent, but I have a slightly different take. Just this past week, when my friend Jason posited me with the same question of whether or not an atheist can be “moral,” my answer was “of course atheists are moral!”

As an atheist what incentive do I have to want to have to hose down bloody side-walks after waking up from a night riddled with blood lust and carnage?  Why would I want to have to drive around bodies scattered along the Fairfax County Parkway on my way to Mason each day? None of us want that, and we have no desire to live in a world like that. Isn’t that simple fact alone enough to prevent us from living in a world of baby-raping anarchy? As far as I can tell, belief in a God, or some other construct of your choosing really doesn’t seem to get you much more than that. If it gets you anything at all, it seems to be a false air of moral superiority that is just thoroughly annoying.

Atheists, and people as a whole, are perfectly capable of being good for goodness sake.

Sunday Poem

The Little Pilgrim

Cranberries dripping down my chin

Have stained my pilgrim suit.

I ate too much Thanksgiving day

But I don’t give a hoot.

I slurped a pile of dressing,

Gobbled down a turkey thigh,

Dribbled messy cranberries

Devoured some pumpkin pie.

Within me on this special day

It’s a thankful heart that beats.

For all the things that I enjoy

But mainly for the eats.

—Grandpa Tucker

The Reason of Rules & Contractarianism

In the continuing research for my Public Choice paper, I started reading Brennan & Buchanan’s The Reason of Rules; my basic argument is that a primary reason for Githongo’s failure is that the rules in Kenya are absolutely atrocious, but this post isn’t about Kenya. Actually over the next couple of days whenever I write something related to that paper, just assume what follows has nothing to do with my paper, this post for example is about contractarianism.

Chapter 2 is where Brennan & Buchanan discuss the social contract as they see it, I found it particularly interesting because I do consider myself a contractarian in that I do accept the public goods justification for the existence of the state (although I probably accept less public goods than most people do.), and in that I agree that our rights come from agreement, not through reason or God. This makes for some rather interesting conversations at GMU, because while I can’t prove this for certain, it seems like most of the libertarians I know are natural rights libertarians, with those rights being derived from either God, or Reason.

The main objection my natural friends present to me is “Ugh! The social contract doesn’t even really exist! How can you believe that?” I usually then say the same thing about natural rights in kind of a mocking tone, but that’s neither here not there. Hume, my favorite moral philosopher made the same point my friends are trying to make, only more eloquently and better, because you know, he’s Scottish, and he’s David Hume:

AS no party, in the present age can well support itself without a philosophical or speculative system of principles annexed to its political or practical one; we accordingly find that each of the factions into which this nation is divided has reared up a fabric of the former kind, in order to protect and cover that scheme of actions which it pursues. . . . The one party [defenders of the absolute and divine right of kings, or Tories], by tracing up government to the DEITY, endeavor to render it so sacred and inviolate that it must be little less than sacrilege, however tyrannical it may become, to touch or invade it in the smallest article. The other party [the Whigs, or believers in constitutional monarchy], by founding government altogether on the consent of the PEOPLE suppose that there is a kind of original contract by which the subjects have tacitly reserved the power of resisting their sovereign, whenever they find themselves aggrieved by that authority with which they have for certain purposes voluntarily entrusted him. –David Hume, “On Civil Liberty” [II.XII.1]

If you don’t want to actually read that, his basic claim is that the idea of a “social contract,” is a work of fiction.

My response to my friends is that they (as well as Hume) are completely missing the point of contractarianism. The point is not that societies are literally founded upon social contracts (Although pirates apparently did), the point is that contractarianism can be used ex post facto to legitimize the existance of the state, so long as the state follows certain rules. Buchanan & Brennan do a much better job with this argument (In my defense, I don’t have a Nobel Prize):

As noted earlier, the empirical record of the establishment of historical states is essentially irrelevant (added emphasis is mine)to the contractarian explanatory argument. The fact that most historical states have emerged from conquest of the weak by the strong does not render unimportant or irrelevant the question,Can the existing state as observed within the rules that describe its operations be legitimized in the broadly defined contractarian vision? To deny the relevance of this question, and at the same time to hold the contractarian presuppositions, would amount to making the charge that all observable states are illegitimate. In this case, the contractarian must join with the ranks of the revolutionaries. If, however, within broad limits, the state can be legitimized “as if,” it emerged contractually, the way is left open for constructive constitutional reform. Existing rules can be changed contractually even if they did not so emerge.

That’s the point of contractarianism.

Andrea Lively, Guest Blogger

This week I’ve had this fantastic running discussion with my friend Andrea about Objectivism, reality, natural rights, altruism and morality. I’ve asked her to post her thoughts on really whatever she feels like regarding these subjects because her and I seem to think along the same lines, but for whatever reason, when we do disagree, we somehow seem to end up at the opposite ends of the idealogical spectrum; needless to say I find this somewhat interesting. I have no idea what she has planned, one long post, a post on each subject (I vote for this if it matters btw) or something completely different, but if you enjoy reading her arguments half as much as I enjoy my discussions with her, you’re going to find your utility curve shifting to the right.

A little bit about Andrea…Well, for starters you’ve already seen her presence on this blog before, she’s the one that showed me the website that turned into the post This is Why You’re Fat. She’s first violin second chair in the GMU orchestra if I have that right, a music major with an economics minor, by the way, she’s played the Kennedy Center, so you could say she’s okay at the violin. Andrea’s a fellow INTJ and enjoys the good economics/philosophy/statistics joke just as much as the next person. O yeah! She really does stomp her foot when frustrated, something I thought only happened in books and on tv.

As I said, I have no idea what she’s planning, but without further ado, ladies and gentlemen, Ms. Andrea Lively.